“Nothing, as a matter of fact, is more closed to us than this animal life from which we are descended. … Animal life, halfway distant from our consciousness, presents us with a disconcerting enigma. In picturing the universe without man, a universe in which only the animal’s gaze would be opened to things, the animal being neither a thing nor a man, we can only call up a vision in which we see nothing…”

– Georges Bataille1

Night Mare (Cheval blȇme, 2009), directed by Philippe Rouy, is a simple and frightening film.2 It is a swift (3 minutes 55 seconds) and economical (two-shot structure) exploration of the limits of comprehension, designed to induce a sense of disquietude in the viewer. Rouy’s is a film about seeing disturbing events and about the disturbing experience of not knowing how to relate to the perspective from which these events are being shown – not knowing, that is, whether and how what is being seen is also registering in the mind.

The film’s principal protagonist is a mare. A mare cinematically solicited – forced, really, by way of montage – into perceiving and contemplating a chilling human ritual of institutionalised violence: a public execution. In a series of meditative, melancholy-tinged superimpositions and dissolves, accompanied by a profusely ominous musical score, Rouy constructs a semblance of animal’s mental space by bringing together: (1) a series of tight, hand-held, rusty-orange close-ups of the mare’s face and eyes; and, (2) archival, black-and-white documentary footage of the last public execution by guillotine in France.

In the early morning hours of June 17, 1939, Eugen Weidmann, a kidnapper and mass murderer, was beheaded outside the prison Saint-Pierre in Versailles. The overly enthusiastic reaction to this event by the rowdy crowd of spectators (some, supposedly, even dipped their handkerchiefs into the condemned man’s blood) subsequently caused a ban to be put on all public executions in the country.3 However, unbeknownst to the authorities, Weidmann’s decapitation was secretly filmed – given “material eternity,” as André Bazin would have it – from a building adjacent to the prison.4 A disturbing amateur record thus exists of the soon to be banished, macabre social ritual: the notorious technology of streamlined cruelty delivering capital punishment in broad daylight, on a crowded city sidewalk.

Rouy makes extensive use of this high-angle, single-shot film, as he constructs nightmarish “mental images” which aim to situate the film’s human viewer inside non-human perception and consciousness – the psychic apparatus of a mare preoccupied with the guillotine.5 In the course of his short film, Rouy loops the archival footage of the execution no less than seven times. He employs montage like an obsessive-compulsive who insists – demands – that the disturbing images of the killing be dealt with, worked through by the mare. At a decisive moment, the filmmaker even freezes the gruesome documentary footage. He suspends the falling blade of the guillotine in mid-air and temporarily delays death’s arrival, as if thereby to invite the animal to “zoom in” on a particularly significant aspect of the imagery he is asking it to process: that “elusive passage from one state to another” when, in Bazin’s words, death “marks the frontier between the duration of consciousness and the objective time of things.”6

One invention of the Industrial Revolution is thus encouraged to interrogate another. The cinematographic apparatus is invited to help comprehend the workings of a death-machine. Victor Hugo’s ominous declaration (which Rouy uses as the hypograph for his film) – “The scaffold is vision” – is made literal.7

The filmmaker’s pursuit of animal perception and cognition in his morbid cinematic set-up overlaps two distinct manifestations of the “power of negativity” (Hegel): (1) death as the negation of life, the ultimate and most feared “nonactual that deactualizes”;8 and, (2) the freeze-frame (on the guillotine’s falling blade) as the film machine’s own, reflexive epistemological negation of movement and duration, those defining features of its distinct regime of visual representation.9

However, despite this twofold effort to “energize thought” by the “tremendous power of the negative” – simultaneously on the level of the represented content (1) and film form (2) – the mare’s consciousness remains inaccessible, a complete unknown. As the film’s tagline puts it: “On 17 June 1939 a man was guillotined in public in front of a camera. The eyes of a horse will never know anything of it.” Throughout the film, the animal’s face stays blank, expressionless. Its gaze appears frustratingly detached from the execution. Nor does it lend itself to any sort of rapport with the film’s viewer.

The power of such palpable disconnect is that it generates an overwhelming sense of discontent. Does it (as the film’s tagline would seem to suggest) indicate the mare’s utter inability to comprehend the horrors of socially orchestrated violence? Or does it, rather, signal the animal’s radical indifference to this horror? Furthermore, what if this chilling “indifference” (a complement to the equally chilling indifference of the guillotine) is actually a symptom of the mare’s total repugnance – a surface manifestation of what is, in fact, a profound interior (conscious?) indignation with the human condition as such? This would make the animal gaze an uncanny vehicle of categorical condemnation. As Slavoj Žižek writes: “[W]hat it expresses is perhaps the horror at having encountered The Animal, namely, ourselves, humans: what the [animal] sees is us in all our monstrosity, and what we see in its … gaze is our own monstrosity.”10 Monstrosity of the human-animal, the instrumental-rational murderer!

“Philosophy actually exists,” Theodor Adorno once said, “in order to redeem what is to be found in the gaze of an animal.”11 The macabre dissolves and superimpositions of Rouy’s Night Mare pose a challenge to cinema to join in this redemptive labour.

Endnotes

  1. Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion (New York: Zone, 1992), trans. Robert Hurley, pp. 20–21. ↩
  2. Philippe Rouy is a French film and video artist whose works include Hypn (2009), Cheval blême (2009), and the “Fukushima trilogy” (4 Buildings Facing the Sea, 2012; Machine to Machine, 2013; Fovea Centralis, 2014). ↩
  3. One of those who attended this execution was the (disgusted) 17-year-old Christopher Lee, who would later become a famous horror film star. Lee is best known for his numerous portrayals of Dracula, but in 1989 he also played the role of Charles-Henri Sanson, France’s most famous executioner, in the film La Révolution française. See Christopher Lee, Lord of Misrule (London: Orion, 2003), pp. 57-61. ↩
  4. André Bazin, “Death Every Afternoon,” in Rites of Realism, ed. Ivone Margulies (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 31. ↩
  5. For an influential theoretical discussion of mental or relational images, see Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 200-205. It is also impossible not to think of Rouy’s superimpositions as variations on the montage dynamic known as the “Kuleshov effect” (named after the silent era Soviet filmmaker, Lev Kuleshov, who famously experimented with, and theorised, ways in which meaning is produced and emotions solicited in the viewer when one and the same close-up of the human face is edited together with different shots of what the depicted person “sees”). ↩
  6. Bazin, p. 30. For a rich analysis of the intertwined temporalities (defined by instantaneity and indexicality) of the guillotine, photography, and cinema, and, more specifically, how this intertwinement relates to the film of Weidmann’s execution and André Bazin’s ontology of the photographic image, see: Gwynne Fulton, “’Phantasmatics’: Sovereignty and the Image of Death in Derrida’s First ‘Death Penalty’ Seminar,” Mosaic 48, no. 3 (September 2015), pp. 75-94. ↩
  7. In Les Misérables, Hugo famously describes the fear-inducing effects of the guillotine’s automated efficiency, and its privileged socio-symbolic status as an enforcer of the Law: “The scaffold, indeed, when it is prepared and set up, has the effect of a hallucination. We may be indifferent to the death penalty, and may not declare ourselves, yes or no, so long as we have not seen a guillotine with our own eyes. But when we see one, the shock is violent, and we are compelled to decide and take part, for or against. (…) The guillotine is the embodiment of the law; it is called the Avenger; it is not neutral and does not permit you to remain neutral. He who sees it quakes with the most mysterious of tremblings. All social questions set up their points of interrogation around this axe. The scaffold is vision. The scaffold is not a mere frame, the scaffold is not a machine, the scaffold is not an inert piece of mechanism made of wood, of iron, and of ropes. It seems to have an indefinable, sinister life of its own, of whose origin we can have no idea; one would say that this frame can see, that this machine can hear, that this mechanism can understand; that this wood, this iron, and these ropes, have a will. In the hideous nightmare into which its presence casts the soul, the awe inspiring apparition of the scaffold blends with its horrid work. The scaffold becomes the accomplice of the executioner; it devours, it eats flesh, and it drinks blood. The scaffold is a sort of monster created by the judge and the workman, a specter which seems to live with a kind of unspeakable life, drawn from all the death which it has wrought.” Victor Hugo, Les Misérables (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2003), pp. 132-133. ↩
  8. Hegel: “Death, if that is what we wish to call this non-actuality, is the most fearful thing of all, and to keep and hold fast to what is dead requires only the greatest force. (…) However, the life of spirit is not a life that is fearing death and austerely saving itself from ruin; rather, it bears death calmly, and in death, it sustains itself. Spirit only wins its truth by finding its feet in its absolute disruption. Spirit is not this power which, as the positive, avoids looking at the negative, as is the case when we say of something that it is nothing, or that it is false, and then, being done with it, go off on our own way on to something else. No, Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and lingering with it. This lingering is the magic power that converts it into being.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 20-21. ↩
  9. Hegel again: “To break up a representation into its original elements (author’s note: here, distinct, static film-frames) is to return to its moments, which at least do not have the form of a representation which one has simply stumbled across as it is encountered, but which instead constitute the immediate possession of the self. To be sure, this analysis would only arrive at thoughts which are themselves familiar and fixed, or it would arrive at motionless determinations. However, what is separated, the nonactual itself, is itself an essential moment, for the concrete is self-moving only because it divides itself and turns itself into the non-actual. The activity of separating is the force and labor of the understanding…” Ibid., pp. 20. ↩
  10. Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2013), p. 413. In a related manner, Jacques Derrida writes: “As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called ‘animal’ offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say, the bordercrossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself, thereby calling himself by the name that he believes he gives himself.” See Jacques Derrida, Animal That Therefore I am (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), p. 12. ↩
  11. Quoted from: Detlev Claussen, Theodor W. Adorno: One Last Genius (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2008), p. 255. ↩

About The Author

Pavle Levi is professor of film studies in the Department of Art & Art History at Stanford. He is the author of numerous books, including Jolted Images: Unbound Analytic (2018), Minijature (2021), and Hypnos in Cineland (2022).

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